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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

to the interest of the survivors, in case of death of one of them,
the rule became very pertinent.
ELMER M. LEESMAN.
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-TESTATOR'S

DECLARATIONS OF REVOCA-

TION.7-In a proceeding to probate an alleged lost will, defendants
contended that the will had been destroyed by the testatrix animo
revocandi, and to sustain that contention, were permitted to prove
statements of the testatrix to the effect that her will was unsatisfactory and that she had put it in the stove and destroyed it. Held:
that such statements were properly received."
In support of this ruling the opinion quotes the following
passage:
"The declarations of a testator after the execution of his will are
admissible, in the event of its loss, to show that it had not been can574.) Under the same circumcelled. (In the matter of Page 118 Ill.
stances they are admissible to show that' 2 the loss or destruction was in
accordance with the testator's purpose."

The case of Holler v. Holler was a proceeding to probate a lost
will, but the declarations of the testator there admitted simply
expressed his dissatisfaction with his will and implied an intention to
die intestate. There is a familiar exception to the hearsay rule
under which statements of a person expressly or impliedly asserting
his then present state of mind or feelings are admissible when such
mental state is a proper fact to be proved. The reason for this
hearsay exception is the practical difficulty of proving a mental state
in any other way.
"The existence of a particular intention in a certain person at a
certain time being a material fact to be proved, evidence that he expressed that intention at the time is as direct evidence of the fact as
his own testimony that he then had that intention would be. After his
death there can hardly be any other way of proving it."
Since a man's acts are generally the result of his intentions and
feelings, such mental states may be proved as a basis for an inference as to his probable conduct.
"The declaration of a party that he intends to do a certain act, or
pursue a certain course of conduct, is always admissible when the issue
is whether the party making the declaration did the act or followed the
those feelings
course of conduct, because the declaration proves that
'4
exist which prompt the act or the course of conduct.
Accordingly, declarations of intention to prove conduct have
been admitted in a great variety of cases.
Thus, on the issue of self defense, uncommunicated threats by
are admissible to show that he was probably the agdeceased
the
gressor.5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Leemon v. Leighton (1924) 145 N. E. (Ill.) 631; 314 Ill. 407.
Holler v. Holler (1921) 298 I1. 418.
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon (1891) 145 U. S. 285.
Mills v. Lumber Co. (1893) 63 Conn. 103.
Campbell v. People (1854) 16 Ill. 17.
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For the same reason, threats of suicide by the deceased are
admissible to prove self-destruction. 6
Statements of an intention to take a certain trip have been
admitted to prove that the declarant did so.7
Declarations by a testator of his intention to dispose of his
property in a certain way have been admitted to prove that an interlineation in a will was probably made at the time of execution.8
The Holler case is strictly in line with these precedents in
admitting declarations by the testator, showing his intention to
revoke his will, for the purpose of proving that its disappearance
was probably the result of that intention.
Whereas in the principal case the declarations directly asserted
a past intention and a past act. For this purpose hearsay is not
generally receivable. Statements to prove some mental state of the
speaker are limited to such as indicate the state of mind at the time
the words were spoken. 9
From the speaker's state of mind at the time of making the
declaration it may be possible to infer his past state of mind; as in
one of the bankruptcy cases' 0 where the debtor's statements as to
his then fear of action by his creditors was admitted to show that
his prior departure from England was for the purpose of hindering
or delaying creditors. But such cases do not involve the admission
of declarations directly asserting past matters, whether subjective
or objective. In a number of the lost will cases, declarations by the
testator expressing satisfaction with his will and referring to it
as in existence have been admitted to negative revocation.,,
So far as these cases involve declarations by the testator of
his satisfaction with his will, the reasoning is the same as in the
other cases of inferences from a mental state to probable conduct.
If the testator was satisfied with his will, as his declarations indicate, he would not be apt to revoke it, and hence its disappearance
was probably due to some other cause.
In the cases where statements referring to the will as in existence have been admitted there was a fair implication of an absence
of intention to revoke, as where the testator tells the members of
his family that his will is in the keeping of his banker or his lawyer,
or is among his papers, etc. It has also been suggested that such
statements show his belief in the existence of the will, which he
could not have if he had theretofore intentionally destroyed it, thus
negativing prior intentional destruction by him. It is to be noted
that even on this theory the statements are not admitted to prove
that the will was then actually in existence, but merely that testator
6. Commonwealth v. Trefethen (1892) 157 Mass. 180; State v. Ilginfritez

(1915) 263 Mo. 615. On this question the Supreme Court of Illinois requires

that the statements of intention be very closely connected in point of time
with the alleged act; Greenacre v. Filby (1916) 276 11. 294.
7. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilmon (1891) 145 U. S. 285.

8. Doe v. Palner (1851) 16 Q. B. 747.

9. Salem v. Lynn (1847) 13 Metc. 544.
10. Rawson v. Haight (1824) 2 Bing. 99.
11. Whilely v. King (1864) 17 C. B. (N. S.) 756; Sugden v. St. Leon.ards (1876) 1 Pro. Div. 154; In re Page (1886) 118 Ill. 576.
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so believed. This is quite different from using the testator's statement of a past physical act, to prove that such act really occurred,
i. e., his statement that at some previous time he destroyed his will,
to prove that he actually destroyed it.
That is the typical sort of evidence that the hearsay rule shuts
out unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions. The
older cases do not recognize any exception for such statements bj
a testator any more than in the case of any other person.
On this ground the English Court of Probate
rejected state12
ments by a testator that he had revoked his will.

In another case,"1 it was sought to prove the contents of a lost
will by the declarations of the testator showing what disposition he
had made of his property. In holding the statements inadmissible
Sir J. P. Wilde observed:
"The court has sought in vain for any principle or authority to
justify the reception of such statements in evidence for the purpose of
proving the actual contents of the absent will. It is familiar practice
enough to receive the unsworn declarations of the testator in evidence,
for the purpose of arriving at his general intentions where his competency is in dispute, or where there is any imputation of fraud in the

making of his will. For in such cases the state of his mind and
affections is in itself a material fact, of which such statements are the
fair exponents. But where these declarations are vouched to prove,
not only the testator's intentions, but the fact that he had declared and
embodied those intentions in a certain will, they have no other title to
confidence than the statements of any other person who had seen the
will and could speak to its contents. In this aspect they became mere
hearsay, and open to the well known rule excluding them as such."
The first suggestion in England of an exception in favor of a
testator's declarations of a past fact occurred in the famous case
4
of Sugden v. St. Leonards.1
The will of the late Lord Chancelloi
St. Leonards had disappeared under very suspicious circumstances.
The evidence made it highly improbable that the testator had destroyed it. The difficulty was in proving its contents. The main
evidence on this point was given by one of the legatees who took
a large interest under the will.
In the court of probate declaration by the testator as to the
contents of his will were received though not considered by Hannen, J., because he thought them inadmissible. The will was accordingly admitted to probate on the balance of the evidence which was
clearly unobjectionable. The court of appeal agreed with Hannen, J., that there was sufficient evidence of the contents without
the testator's declarations. Chief Justice Cockburn observed, however, that he was glad to find corroboration of the direct evidence
of Miss Sugden, and that the testator's declarations were admissible
for that purpose, because in a number of instances declarations of
deceased persons were admitted where such persons had peculiar
12. Staines v. Stewart (1861) 2 Sw. and Tr. 320.
13. Quick v. Quick (1864) 3 Sw. and Tr. 442.

14. (1876) 1 Prob. Div. 154.
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means of knowledge and no motive to misstate, as in case of declarations by deceased members of a family in pedigree matters.
The pedigree exception is, of course, as old as the hearsay rule
itself, but was never before successfully invoked to justify the
of a very different sort of hearsay in a non-pedigree
admission
5
case.1

Jessell, M. R., examined a number of the hearsay exceptions
and found that in each the declarant was unavailable as a witness;
that he had peculiar, or at least, personal knowledge of the facts;
and that he had no motive to misstate, or at least was not speaking
in his own interest. As all these conditions seemed to exist in the
case of declarations by a testator as to the contents of his will, he
thought that they should also be admitted.
It is doubtless true that in most of the recognized hearsay exceptions the testimony of the declarant cannot be obtained, and there
is some guaranty of the truth of the statement. For example, in
the case of dying declarations, the guaranty is found in the condition of the declarant.
In the case of statements against interest by deceased persons,
it is self-interest which gives weight to the statement.
In the pedigree cases it is the absence of any motive to misstate
family relationship. In the case of entries in the regular course of
business, if is the fact that the entry is made at the time of the
transaction according to a regular practice.
But it was never before contended that the hearsay exceptions
could be extended indefinitely by analogy. Dying declarations are
not admitted in civil cases.' 0 Statements against7 interest do not
Such examples
include the confession of a crime by a third party.
might be multiplied to great length. The traditional view of the
hearsay exceptions was thus expressed by Mellish. J., in the
St. Leonard's case:
"I think it would be a highly desirable improvement in the law if
the rule was that all statements made by persons who are dead respectknowledge, and made ante
ing matters of which they had personal
litem motam, should be admissible.' 8 There is no doubt that by rejecting such evidence we do reject a most valuable source of evidence.
But the difficulty I feel is this, that I cannot satisfactorily to my own
mind find any distinction between the statements of a testator as to the
contents of his will, and any other statement of a deceased person as
to any fact peculiarly within his knowledge, which, beyond all question,
as the law now stands, we are not as a general rule entitled to receive."
In a later case,'0 the House of Lords doubted the soundness
15. Rex v. Erith (1807) 8 East. 539.
16. Marshall v. Ry. (1868) 48 Ill. 475.
17. Connely v. U. S. (1913) 228 U. S. 243.
18. This suggestion appears to have been embodied in the Massachusetts
statute, R. L ch. 175, sec. 66: "A declaration of a deceased person shall not
be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in
good faith before the commencement of the action and upon the personal
knowledge of the declarant."
19. Woodward v. Gonistone (1886) 11 A. C. 469.
/
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of the dicta in Sugden v. St. Leonards, and left the question undecided. In this country the St. Leonards case has been quite generally accepted as establishing the admissibility of a testator's declarations as to the contents of his will to corroborate other evidence
of contents,
though not per se sufficient to establish the contents of
20
a lost will.

If a testator's declarations as to the contents of his will are
admitted as corroborative proof of contents; it is difficult to find any
satisfactory distinction which would exclude his declarations of any
other fact connected with his will. Accordingly, subsequent declarations of revocation have been admitted to prove that
a mutilation
21
of a will by the testator was done animo revocandi.
The principal case takes the last step and admits a declaration
by a testator that he had destroyed his will to prove that it was really
destroyed by him.
The wisdom of creating such an exception to the hearsay rule
may be doubted. It will probably be invoked to admit declarations
of the testator to prove that fraud was practiced on him or that
some legatee influenced him, although up to
this time they have
22
not generally been received for this purpose.
The proof of statements of deceased persons by interested witnesses always involves danger of fabrication, which is hard to controvert because the alleged conversation usually takes place when
no third person was present. And even where the statements were
really made, 'their value is difficult to estimate because they may
have been made for a purpose, for example, to pacify a dissatisfied
legatee. Doubtless, much the same dangers exist in the case of other
exceptions to the hearsay rule. But that fact would suggest caution
in multiplying the exceptions.
E. W. HINTON.
LAND

LEASis-COVENANTS

RUNNING

WITH

THE

LAND IN

LEASES.-In Atwood v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co.,'

a lease from the railroad company of land upon which the lessee
erected a grain elevator, contained a clause exempting the lessor
from liability for destruction of the elevator by fire caused by
lessor's negligence or otherwise. The lessee assigned his rights
under the lease to his son who brought action against the lessor for
negligence whereby the elevator caught fire from sparks emitted by
lessor's locomotives. One of the questions in the case was whether
or not the covenant of non-liability bound the assignee. This,
therefore, involved the inquiry, "Did the burden run with the leasehold ?" and this was to be answered by the answer to the query,
"Does that covenant touch the land demised ?"
20.
262 Ill.
50 Neb.
21.
22.

In re Page (1886) 118 Ill. 576; Griffith v. Higginbothon (1914)
126; Mann v. Balfour (1905) 187 Mo. 290; Clark v. Turner (1897)
290; Cantway v. Cantway (1925 Ill.) 146 N. E. 148.
Burton v. Wylde (1914) 261 Ill. 397.
Wigmore "Ev." (2 ed.) sec. 1738.

1. (1924) 313 Ill. 59.

